

LONG TERM CONSULTANCY CONTRACT TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANCY SERVICES IN SUPPORT OF THE PSD-HUB PROGRAMME IN ETHIOPIA

BASELINE SURVEY ON COMPETITION AND MARKETS IN ETHIOPIA

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- Project aimed at providing a first assessment of the level of competition prevailing in the Ethiopian economy
- Relatively small assignment (2 consultants with a total of 60 days). Some interviews, but largely based on secondary sources
- Follows earlier PSD Hub work on legal and institutional aspects of competition policy (end 2008)







• Primary focus on **structural factors**, which contribute to determine the level and intensity of competition, such as the presence of state-owned or endowment enterprises, the level of concentration and the relevance of barriers to entry

	Dimensions of competition distortion (1)									
Market	I. Market Share of Leading Operators	II. Asymmetry among Operators	III. Presence of State - Endowme nt Operators	IV. Presence of Vertically Integrated Operators/ Privileged Relations	V. Economic & Technical Entry Barriers	VI. Presence of Regulatory Obstacles	TOTAL Score	Distorted Competition Rank		
Market X	2	2	1	1	1	1	8	9		
Market Y	5	4	5	4	4	2	24	2		

• Instances of (alleged) **anticompetitive practices** (price fixing, hoarding and exclusive distribution agreements) also analyzed



COVERAGE



Analyzed **14 markets** (sectors), representing a wide range of conditions, namely:

- **Consumer Goods**: flour milling, beer, soft drinks/mineral water, sugar, edible oil
- Agriculture and Related Inputs: cereals, fertilizers
- Manufacturing: textiles and apparel, cement
- **Financial Services**: banking, microfinance, insurance
- **Transport Services**: road freight transport, road passenger transport



KEY FINDINGS – STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS



- Monopolized/highly concentrated markets, dominated by state-owned or endowment enterprises. These include fertilizers and sugar, plus the special case of microfinance. In these markets, basically there is no competition to speak of and state-owned/endowment entities are fully in control
- Highly concentrated markets with a dominant but declining state/endowment presence. Include the markets for 'standard' financial services, banking and insurance, and for cement. In these cases, state-owned enterprises are still largely in command, but their position has been gradually eroded by private competitors






- Highly concentrated markets with private sector dominance. Include the markets for manufactured consumer goods, such as **beer** and **soft drinks/mineral water**. Here, large private companies play a dominant role but competition among operators, albeit imperfect, is indeed present
- Low-moderately concentrated markets with private sector dominance. Include the markets for basic food items, such as cereals, edible oil and flour, for textiles and apparel, and for road transport services. The situation may not be always ideal (some degree of dominance may exist in specific local markets), but overall competition appears to be fairly effective





Private operators virtually eliminated from the import of fertilizers










A highly concentrated banking sector...










.... But the importance of state-owned banks is declining










Cement is often regarded as 'monopolized', but this does not takes into account imports





KEY FINDINGS – ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS

- **Price fixing** (i.e. instances where producers/sellers combine in order to collectively raise prices). An example of <u>alleged</u> price fixing is represented by the nearly simultaneous increase in prices implemented by **breweries** at the end of 2007/beginning of 2008 (but raw materials also more expensive..)
- Hoarding (i.e. situations in which stocks of goods are deliberately withheld from trade in order to achieve higher prices). Accusations of hoarding are <u>quite widespread</u> in Ethiopia, especially in the case of agricultural products (e.g. cereals) and basic commodities (e.g. flour and sugar), but <u>rarely rigorously substantiated</u>,



KEY FINDINGS – ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS



- **Predatory behavior**, whereby producers try to enforce exclusive distribution arrangements by refusing supplies to retailers who also carry competing products. Commonly found in branded goods (e.g. **soft drinks**)
- Improper dealing with related parties. Accusations of favoritism are particularly widespread in the financial market, where state-owned/endowment banks and insurers are often accused of benefiting from privileged relations with other state-owned and endowment enterprises
- Unfair competition, often blamed on importers ('contraband'), whenever they are more competitive than local producers



SOME EVIDENCE



Evidence regarding anticompetitive behavior is more often than not ambiguous, and does not allow to reach clear cut conclusions

See the case of alleged 'contraband' in edible oil

Period	Type of Oil	Tigray	Amhara	Oromya	SNNP	Addis			
renou		Unit Price (ETB per liter)							
August 2005	Imported	12,12	11,9	12,51	12,89	12,89			
August 2005	Domestic	11,59	12,05	11,25	11,20	11,78			
September 2006	Imported	11,81	12,40	12,79	13,67	13,45			
September 2000	Domestic	13,89	12,83	11,48	11,65	13,23			
August 2007	Imported	16,73	17,07	17,22	17,77	17,30			
August 2007	Domestic	19,30	21,09	18,66	17,87	22,21			
		Price Ratio (domestic/imported)							
August 2005	96%	101%	90%	87%	91%				
September 2006	118%	103%	90%	85%	98%				
August 2007		115%	124%	108%	101%	128%			







OVERALL APPROACH

- Reconcile development policy and competition policy. The benefits of competition have been too often sacrificed to the achievement of other policy objectives. Also, it appears that this has been done without performing a careful analysis of the pros and cons of the various policy options
- Adopt measures capable of bridging the supply demand gap and of stabilizing expectations. Certain anticompetitive behaviors can only take place when there is a marked unbalance between supply and demand and/or when economic operators' expect dramatic changes in fundamental parameters (e.g. exchange rate). In turn, this is often due to Government policy.







POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL

- Accelerate privatization (but not always easy, and not a panacea either)
- **Promote entry of new market participants** (was done in cement, could be done in fertilizers)
- **Remove barriers to the entry of foreign operators** (most important in the financial sector & telecoms)
- **Strengthen the TPC** (more investigative powers and resources)
- Adopt a tough attitude towards exclusive distribution arrangements (to be considered illegal *per se*)







OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL MEASURES

- Establish a working group focusing on competition issues and involving both private and public sector (mutual understanding of respective positions must improve)
- Improve accessibility of information on competition issues (listing and consolidation of sources, data on other countries for benchmarking purposes, etc.)
- Carry out <u>detailed</u> studies on selected markets (but this requires adequate resources)

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION



